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Turkey is actually more important than ever to U.S. interests in Europe and the Middle East.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Turkish Republic was established on October 29, 1923 , ending 631 years of Ottoman rule. 2 The Ataturk led the country through a series of political, economic and cultural reforms that designed to modernize Turkey. In the words of Ataturk the movement was "to reach the level of contemporary civilization". Turkey immediately established strong political relationships with the West and based her political and legal system on the modern secular model. One. This rich history produces some definite regional ambitions and relationships that are worth exploration. between the Iraqi governing council and Turkey. Turkey is in a unique position to be a major regional influence and is willing to perform that job. This will help foster U.S. interests in the modern strategic environment.
REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
In another display of Turkish regional influence and support to the Global War on
Terrorism, Turkey sent a task force to Afghanistan and provided the Joint Task Force headquarters for an extended period of time. 10 Turkey continues to demonstrate that it is an effective ally in the world.
RELIGION
Ninety-eight percent of Turkey's population is Muslim. 11 The Government of Turkey is built on a secular, democratic foundation and it continues to strive to separate religion from politics. However, this leads to a discussion of the Christian versus Muslim religions. Many
Westerners have no problem with Islam, but only with violent Muslim extremists. 12 The two religions have coexisted in times of peace; however, many wars have erupted from both the differences, as well as, the similarities between the religions. Both Christians and Muslims believe that there is only one true faith and that all humans should be converted to that faith.
There are significant parallels in the idea of "jihad" and a crusade. Modern analysts cite five factors to be aware of in the current worldwide clash between Muslims and Christians. First is the Muslim population growth that is producing large numbers of unemployed youth to fill the ranks of fanatics. Secondly, there is resurgence in the Islamic belief of character and worth over the western culture. Thirdly, the West is maintaining its military and economic superiority causing interventions in conflicts in the Islamic world. Fourth, the collapse of communism removed the common enemy of both religions. Fifth, there is increasing contact between east and west as a result of globalization. This interaction and intermingling actually increases the friction between the cultures. 13 Over the last fourteen hundred years history has proven that there is conflict between the two religions. The violent nature of the relationship is reflected in the fact that 50% of the wars between 1820 and 1929 were between Muslims and Christians.
14 While resurgence in religious conflict is present, Turkey sets an example for the entire world of how the Muslim religion can prosper in a democratic, secular country and remain in good relations with the West. Therefore, it is of vital importance to U.S. national interests that Turkey be successful.
NATURAL RESOURCES, OIL AND WATER
The Persian Gulf region is critical to world oil production. Estimates show that 34% of American oil will come from the Persian Gulf by the year 2015. 15 America is searching for new areas of energy production to decrease this dependence on the Middle East. The end of the Cold War opened the Caspian basin area for international development. Possible world reserves in the area are approximately 15% of the oil and 12% of the natural gas reserves. 16 This area is replete with economic and political challenges. The Caucus countries are beginning to modernize after the end of the Cold War and international investment is beginning to occur. Security and stability are major concerns. The U.S. is engaged on all fronts of national power to help the region become more stable and to boost the infrastructure which supports energy production and its export from the area. The Baku to Ceyhan pipeline through Tigris and Euphrates river basin not only holds natural resource value, but is also considered to be the cradle of civilization. 18 Turkey has placed great emphasis on its construction projects and control over the water in the area. The $32 billion dollar Southeast Anatolian Project will be comprised of 22 dams, 19 hydroelectric plants and irrigation networks in 13 separate locations. 19 The project is expected to provide electricity and economic prosperity to poorer regions of Turkey and as such is a source of national pride. While the project will greatly benefit the Turkish economy, it could be considered a point of contention with the countries to the south as Turkey gains even more control over the water situation. The treaties and agreements on the flow of water to the south are key to a stable and peaceful region; therefore, the U. S. must be in a position in the future to ensure the water continues to flow.
EXAMPLES OF TURKISH MILITARY NONSUPPORT
Many believe that Turkey is a staunch and loyal supporter of the U. working democratic republic. It is also a member of NATO and a candidate for ensure these U.S. interests are advanced, the U.S. engagement in Turkey is substantial. 22 The U.S. has used a multi-faceted approach to accomplish its objectives in Turkey.
Engagement at all levels has been the norm, but much has been made of the economic and military elements. The Turkish economy has performed poorly and the U.S. has been willing to help with aid and support in the world banking system. 23 The U.S. retains a healthy trade relationship with Turkey and maintains an even import/export ratio. 24 Close connections on the military front and the use of Incirlik Air Base in Adana were critical to U.S. efforts to enforce the UN sanctions against Iraq. 25 The U.S. also uses its diplomatic efforts in world opinion to support Turkey and its desire to become an EU member, as well as, its many other international endeavors. 26 U.S. information policies show support for Turkey in all the media formats worldwide. 27 In fact, the U.S. uses all elements of national power to support Turkey; however, there are risks associated with this support.
U.S. interests in the region are traditionally regarded as necessary due to Turkey's geographic location as the bridge between Europe, the Middle East and Asia. 28 A lack of success in our middle-eastern policies could lead to instability in an area which remains vital to U.S. interest. 29 Therefore the balance of ends, ways and means must be carefully fine tuned to produce minimum risk. 30 Prior to OIF, U.S. policies were feasible, suitable and acceptable, but the situation has changed. As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the regime change in
Iraq and the rise of asymmetrical threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, we must refine our policies toward Turkey. 31 on democracy if they view Turkey in dire straits and abandoned by the U.S. The U.S. cannot afford to take such drastic measures against Turkey. The U.S. must stay engaged to ensure its interests are met; therefore, this course of action will be dismissed. Course of action one and two will be addressed with the backdrop of suitability, feasibility and acceptability, thereby reducing risk and producing a viable strategy toward Turkey.
COURSE OF ACTION NUMBER ONE
COA number one maintains the pre OIF level of engagement with Turkey. This is a viable COA because all elements of U.S. national power are used to engage Turkey while ensuring that U.S. interests in the region are successfully protected. Under this option, the U.S. would maintain strong economic, diplomatic and informational support for the government of Turkey in all its international endeavors and provide economic aid to ensure Turkey remains economically successful. In fact, the Bush administration signaled its desire to mend the relationship by approving a $1 billion aid package. 32 Military engagement would continue to be robust with with Turkey. The President has made the global war on terrorism a high priority for the nation and therefore the military. As a matter of fact, the National Security Strategy lists the number one job of the federal government as defending the nation. 33 The military objectives with Turkey must display an audit trail to the national objectives. This is the area of imbalance in COA 1 after OIF. An ongoing problem with the Government of Turkey is the rift over the Kurdish area of northern Iraq and whether Turkish troops should be allowed to enter that area. 34 The Turkish
General Staff (TGS) is most likely responsible for the lack of support to OIF from Turkish territory. For the past 12 years there have been numerous minor issues with Operation NORTHERN WATCH (ONW) flying from Incirlik Air base and now that ONW has ended these problems can be removed. 35 Since the military situation in the region has changed dramatically, the U.S. should change its military engagement to keep a balanced relationship. There is risk associated with changing the military involvement. The TGS could send troops into northern Iraq and start a civil war in the Kurdish region. This would be a destabilizing factor, however, the TGS did not send troops into northern Iraq during or after OIF. Turkey is now offering to send troops into Iraq. This is a point of contention with the Iraqi governing council, so Turkey is delaying any troop deployment until Iraq ask for them. While COA 1 is feasible, it is not suitable or acceptable given the change in U.S. objectives. The possible second and third order effects of not changing the U.S. policy toward Turkey, favors a different COA.
COURSE OF ACTION NUMBER TWO
COA number two is to maintain or increase our level of engagement on the diplomatic, economic and informational front while decreasing our engagement on the military side. Turkey needs to gain momentum in the economic arena and help in international monetary matters. interests; therefore, the U.S. should decrease engagement supporting the Turkish military.
Another important factor is that Turkey can no longer be viewed as a guaranteed base of As pointed out at the beginning of this paper, Turkey is still an important ally of the U.S.
and its geo-strategic location remains vital. Turkey is a model for fostering the democratic freemarket world that Americans believe is the key to success. With all the changes that have taken place in the last decade in this region, it is time to adjust our engagement strategy with Turkey. The U.S. should increase its diplomatic, informational and economic engagement with Turkey; however, the military involvement should decrease to balance that strategy. Turkey has demonstrated that it will act in its own interests and the U.S. should not rely on Turkeys staunch support. 40 As pointed out in a previous section, Turkey has a history of nonsupport to the U.S.
military. A change in the military engagement will have some beneficial second and third order effects.
Additionally, some have suggested that Turkey should apologize for not supporting the OIF request, but this is unlikely based on Turkish culture. U.S. policy makers must be aware of these issues and engage on a level that will benefit both countries. Turkey did not support the U.S. military; therefore, the military support to Turkey should change, while ensuring Turkey is still supported on the economic front. It is of great importance to the U.S. that Turkey be successful. Many positive results will flow from positive interaction with Turkey after OIF.
The Turkish population was against the war and the government simply supported the will of its' people. The U.S. should not appear to punish Turkey for this democratic ideal or the world will see it as a double standard. The U.S. needs to change the strategy towards Turkey to be in balance with the current world situation. When a stable government arises in Iraq, Turkey will most likely lose some of its military importance to the U.S., but will increase in other values.
In the Islamic world the U.S. military is not a welcome force. Neither is the Turkish military as indicated by the bombing near the Turkish embassy in Baghdad on October 14, 2003.
U.S. needs to disengage and allow a multinational force, approved by the UN, to intervene to help secure the peace and move Iraq toward democracy. Turkey may be one of those forces when they are disassociated from the U.S. Turkey can also have a major role in the most pressing problem in the Middle East by working to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 42 The U.S. must let Turkey assume a greater leadership role in the region. Turkey remains a valued partner in the quest for peace and prosperity for the world.
Both COAs provide suitable, feasible and acceptable strategies. The difference is in the degree of risk the U.S. is willing to take, but as Art Lykke points out, some degree of risk is associated with any COA. 43 Staying the course in Turkey, as with COA 1, could result in long term instability due to U.S. interference in Middle Eastern affairs. As a matter of fact, the International Institute for Strategic Studies stated on October 15, 2003 that the U.S. led operations in Iraq are increasing the ranks of Islamic militant groups. 44 The U.S. must adjust its strategy toward Turkey and it will provide beneficial second and third order effects that will help stabilize the Middle East region and ensure the U.S. objectives in the area are met. As David Jablonsky said in Chapter 11 of the U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy, page 153, "In an ever more interdependent world in which variables for the strategist within the ends-waysmeans paradigm have increased exponentially, strategist are no nearer a "Philosopher's Stone" than they ever were."
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